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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of social-media-driven (SMD) trading entered the
public consciousness in early 2021 when GameStop’s stock price was
driven up two orders of magnitude by a “hivemind” of individual investors
coordinating their actions via social media.1 Some believe that GameStop’s
stock price is artificially high and destined to fall.2 Yet the stock prices of
GameStop and other prominent SMD trading targets, such as AMC
Entertainment, continue to remain well above historical levels.3
Much recent SMD trading is driven by profit motives.4 But a
meaningful part of the rise has resulted from expressive trading—a subset
of SMD trading—in which investors buy or sell for non-profit-seeking
reasons, such as social or political activism,5 or aesthetic reasons like a
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4 See Anderson, Kidd & Mocsary, supra note 1, at 1224.
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nostalgia play.6 To date, expressive trading has benefited issuers by raising
their stock prices.7 There is nothing, however, to prevent these traders
from employing similar methods for driving down a target’s stock price
(e.g., to influence or extort certain behaviors from issuers).8
At least for now, stock prices raised by SMD trading have been sticky
and appear at least moderately sustainable. The expressive aspect, which
unites the traders under a common banner, is likely a reason that dramatic
price increases resulting from profit-seeking SMD trading have persisted.
Without a nonfinancial motivation to hold the group together, its
members would likely defect to take profits.
In GameStop’s case, hedge funds had taken significant short positions
in its stock, which could have forced the company into liquidation by
driving the stock below its true value.9 Consequently, SMD traders
attempted a short squeeze. They successfully saved the company, raised
their portfolio values, and forced some of the hedge funds out of
business.10
As SMD trading drove GameStop’s and AMC’s stock prices higher, it
provided GameStop and AMC an opportunity to raise additional capital
while facing strong, short-selling pressures. AMC took that opportunity.11
GameStop initially did not, fearing reprisal from the Securities and

Anderson, Kidd & Mocsary, supra note 1, at 1235; see Eamon Javers, Republicans in
Washington Warn Wall Street: The GameStop Populists Are More Powerful than You Think,
CNBC (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/gamestop-republicanswarn-of-trump-style-populist-revolution.html.
7 George A. Mocsary, Jeremy Kidd & John P. Anderson, Insider Trading as a Response to
SocialMedia-Driven Trading, THE FINREG BLOG (July 1, 2021), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thef
inregblog/2021/07/01/insider-trading-as-a-response-to-social-media-driven-trading.
8 Id.; see, e.g., Amber Petrovich, Why We Cannot and Will Not Stop with GameStop,
WASHINGTON
POST
(January
29,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-gamestop-movement-shouldnt-stopthere-use-that-power-for-social-good/2021/01/29/f11a36a8-6266-11eb-9430e7c77b5b0297_story.html.
9 See Anderson, Kidd & Mocsary, supra note 1, at 1239; John McCrank, Short-Selling Under
Spotlight
in
GameStop
Hearing,
U.S.
NEWS
(Feb.
18,
2021),
https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2021-02-18/short-selling-underspotlight-in-gamestop-hearing.
10 Id.; see Shalini Nagarajan & Harry Robertson, These Hedge Funds Have Got Torched by the
Wall Street Bets Army that Targeted Their Short Positions in GameStop, BUSINESS INSIDER
AUSTRALIA (January 29, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/hedge-fundstorched-wall-street-bets-gamestop-short-squeeze-reddit-2021-1.
11 See Jeremy C. Owens, AMC to Ask Shareholders for the Right to Issue 25 Million More Shares,
MARKETWATCH (June 3, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/amc-to-askshareholders-for-right-to-issue-25-million-more-shares-2021-06-03.
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Exchange Commission (SEC),12 but has subsequently raised over $1
billion in a follow-up offering.13
Because SMD trading is likely more than a passing fad, issuers and
their compliance departments should be prepared to respond when
targeted by SMD trading. A question to consider is whether and when
SMD-trading-targeted issuers and their insiders may trade in their firms’
shares without running afoul of insider trading laws.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the current state
of insider trading law, with special focus on the elements of materiality and
publicity. Part II opens with a brief summary of the filing, disclosure, and
other (non-insider-trading related) requirements issuers and their insiders
may face when trading in their own company’s shares under any
circumstance. The remainder of this Part analyzes the insider tradingrelated legal implications of three different scenarios in which issuers and
their insiders trade in their own company’s shares in response to SMD
trading. The analysis reveals that although the issuers’ and insiders’
nonpublic, internal information may be material (and therefore preclude
their legal trading) prior to and just after the onset of third-party SMD
trading in the company’s stock, subsequent SMD price changes (if
sufficiently dramatic) may diminish the importance of the company’s
nonpublic information, rendering it immaterial. If the issuers’ and insiders’
nonpublic information about the firm is immaterial, then they may trade
while in possession of it without violating the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.
I. INSIDER TRADING LAW
Insider trading is essentially a common-law crime. The principal
statutory authority for insider trading liability is Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits the employment of “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in “connection with the
purchase or sale, of any security[.]”14 In 1942 the SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5, making it
unlawful . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
12 See DiNapoli et al., Exclusive: How GameStop Missed Out on Capitalizing on the Reddit Rally,
REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-retail-trading-gamestopcapitalraise/exclusive-how-gamestop-missed-out-on-capitalizing-on-the-reddit-rallyidUSKBN2AB14F.
13 Reuters, GameStop Raises More Than $1 Billion in Latest Share Offer, U.S. NEWS (June 22,
2021),
https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2021-06-22/gamestopraises-about-1-billion-in-latest-equity-offering.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018).
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a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.15

Neither the statute nor the rule explicitly reference insider trading; the
connection is therefore a common-law construct. Moreover, Rule 10b-5
is said to have been “casual[ly]” drafted in response to a report that the
president of a corporation was issuing negative statements about his
employer while purchasing its stock.16 Importantly for the following
discussion, the SEC’s Commissioners approved the rule without debate or
comment about its materiality requirement, leaving the implementation of
this provision open to common-law development as well.17
Although § 10(b) functions as a “catchall” provision, in Chiarella v.
U.S., the Supreme Court clarified that “what it catches must be fraud.” 18
An insider’s trading is only fraudulent if it is based on an information
advantage that the insider has a duty to disclose. The courts recognize such
a duty to disclose under two theories: the “classical theory” and the
“misappropriation theory.”19
Insider trading liability arises under the classical theory when the
issuer, its employee, or an affiliate seeks to benefit from trading (or tipping
others who trade) that firm’s shares based on material nonpublic
information. In such cases, the insider (or constructive insider) violates a
fiduciary or other similar duty of trust and confidence by failing to disclose
the information to the firm’s shareholder (or prospective shareholder) on
the other side of the trade.20
Insider trading liability arises under the misappropriation theory when
one misappropriates material nonpublic information and then trades (or
tips others who trade) on it without first disclosing the intent to trade to
the source of the information. The “misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s violation of a duty to disclose to
those who entrusted him or her with access to the confidential
information” by cheating them out of “the exclusive use of that
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922
(1967)).
17 See Freeman, supra note 16, at 922. There was no discussion save about placement of
the Rule’s last phrase and a comment by Commissioner Sumner Pike that “we are against
fraud aren’t we?”
18 Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 2335 (1980).
19 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
20 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
15
16
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information.”21
Where issuers or their insiders contemplate trading company shares
after a dramatic price swing resulting from being the target of expressive
trading, the principal issue appears to be whether the information on the
basis of which they are trading is material and nonpublic.
The Supreme Court has held that information is “material” for
purposes of insider trading liability if “there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important”22 in making an
investment decision, and there is a “substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”23
But this was not always the materiality standard. Before the Court
decided TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. in 1976, a fact was deemed
material under the broader test of whether there was a “more than
marginal” possibility that it “might affect the value of the corporation’s
stock or securities.”24 Moreover, “inequality of knowledge” about internal
corporate matters—today considered part of the analysis of whether
information is nonpublic—was once also part of the materiality question.25
The Court thus placed a significant restriction on the scope of materiality
by demanding that a fact have a “substantial likelihood” of being regarded
as important by the reasonable investor or of “significantly altering” the
total mix of information available about an issuer. Even with this
limitation, however, as scholars have noted, and as discussed below, the
current materiality test still suffers from ambiguity.26
Courts and the SEC have developed two tests for determining when
information is “nonpublic.” Under the “dissemination and absorption”
test, information must first be “disseminated in a manner calculated to
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
23 Id. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449).
24 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968); see also, e.g., Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 151, 153–54 (1972); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (interpreting § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, which contains a
materiality requirement substantially like that of Rule 10b-5); George A. Mocsary,
Statistically Insignificant Deaths: Disclosing Drug Harms to Investors (and Patients) Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 118–21 (2014).
25 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 327 (5th Cir. 1959)
(quoting Am. Guaranty Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., 23 So. 2d 409, 449 (La.
1945)); see List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1965); Hughes v. SEC,
174 F.2d 969, 973–74 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
26 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A
Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1138–39 (2003).
21
22
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reach the securities marketplace in general through recognized channels of
distribution.”27 Information is disseminated to reach the market “in
general” if it is not directed to any one person or group.28 Recognized
channels of distribution would include the Dow Jones Broad Tape or
national publications such as the Wall Street Journal.29 Even if distributed,
information is not regarded as public until it has been “absorb[ed]” by the
investing public, meaning that enough time must have passed for it to be
“readily translatable into investment action[.]”30 Depending on the
circumstances, absorption may be a matter of minutes or days.
Alternatively, under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH)
test, information may be regarded as public even if it has not been
generally distributed. Under this approach, the “issue is not the number of
people who possess it but whether [trading in an efficient market] has
caused the information to be fully impounded in the price of the particular
stock.”31 The logic behind the ECMH test is that information cannot be
misused for trading profits after it is fully reflected in the price of the
stock.32
Some have questioned whether issuers have the same fiduciary duties
to shareholders as their insiders and, therefore whether issuers can be
liable for Section 10(b) insider trading when buying or selling their own
shares.33 Nevertheless, the SEC takes the position that there is no
distinction between issuers and insiders when it comes to insider trading
liability, and the same elements apply.34 There are, however,
announcement, filing, and disclosure requirements that apply to issuers
In re Certain Trading in the Common Stock of Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 10174, 1973 WL 149283, at *6 (May 25, 1973).
28 Id.
29 See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 854.
30 Id. at 854 n.18.
31 U.S. v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (1993).
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 47–53 (2005) (summarizing state common law suggesting that courts
are mixed on the question of whether a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to individual
shareholders). Lowenstein & Wang go on to note that “[t]he very idea that a corporation
has a fiduciary duty to individual shareholders is troubling. The corporation can act only
through its board of directors, officers, employees, and other agents. These actors are
obligated to act in the best interest of the corporation, which may not coincide with the
best interests of an individual shareholder transacting business with the corporation.” Id.
at 52.
34 Id. at 70–72 (citing, inter alia, SEC v. General Dynamics Corp., Litig. Re. No. 9021; 19
SEC Docket 792, [1979-180 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97, 239, at 97,021
(Feb. 27, 180); text in SEC Rule 10b5-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1) pertaining to entities in
support of the claim that the “SEC has taken the position that a public company cannot
buy its own stock based on material, nonpublic information.”).
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when trading in their own shares. These requirements differ based on the
type of transaction and are summarized in the next Part.
II. TRADING OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR EXPRESSIVE TRADING
TARGETS
If an issuer finds itself a target of expressive trading, what may the
issuer and its insiders do? If the price is driven up, can the corporation or
its insiders sell? If the price is driven down, can they buy? Absent clear
direction from the SEC, this Article assumes an aggressive enforcement
stance by the SEC against any trading in response to expressive trading.
This assumption is prudent because it prepares issuers and insiders for the
“worst-case” enforcement scenario.
A. Other Background Regulations
As a threshold matter, it should be noted that there may be disclosure,
filing, and other requirements for issuers and their insiders when trading
in their own company’s shares that are unrelated to Section 10(b)’s antifraud provisions. For example, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 prohibits “directors,” “officers,” and “principal stockholders”
from earning profits from short-swing trading.35 The statute provides that
any profits an insider earns from a purchase and sale (or sale and purchase)
of their own company’s shares that occurs within a six-month window
“shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer.”36 The insider’s
motivations behind the trade are irrelevant to the rule’s application.37
Section 16(b) actions can only be brought by the issuer or its shareholders,
and disgorgement is the only remedy.38 There are no civil or criminal
penalties for violations of the statute. In addition, Section 16(c) prohibits
35 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2018) (The Exchange Act defines a “director” as “any director of a
corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any organization,
whether incorporated or unincorporated.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2018) (A “principal
stockholder” is defined as one who is “directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 percent of” the relevant company’s shares.); see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(7) (2018); 17
C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2021) (“The term “officer” shall mean an issuer’s president,
principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if there is no such accounting
officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a principal business
unit, division, or function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer who
performs a policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policymaking functions for the issuer.”).
36 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2018).
37 See id. § 78p(b).
38 See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 226 (2014) (noting
that “[u]nlike most federal securities laws, § 16(b) does not confer enforcement authority
on the Securities and Exchange Commission” and limits enforcement to “issuers of stock
and their security holders”).

450

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23

insiders from selling their firm’s shares short.39 Finally, Section 16(a)
imposes special disclosure requirements on statutorily-defined insiders.40
Within 10 days of obtaining the status of director, officer, or principal
stockholder under the statute, insiders must file an electronic report of any
holdings in the issuer’s shares with the SEC.41 Any subsequent trades by
these statutory insiders in the issuer’s shares must be reported in the same
manner within two business days of the transaction.42
Issuers are also subject to announcement and other disclosure
requirements when buying or selling their own shares. The vast majority
of issuer share repurchases are effected on the open market through a
broker.43 Most exchanges require an issuer to announce its board’s
approval of an open-market repurchase program.44 These announcement
requirements are, however, typically limited in scope. For example, a firm
is not required to disclose the number or dollar amount of the shares to
be repurchased or even the program's expiration date.45 Consequently,
firms retain great flexibility in determining when or whether they will
repurchase their shares pursuant to the announcement.46 Issuers often do
not repurchase any shares for months or years after an announcement.47
If an issuer does engage in a repurchase, the SEC requires it to disclose
the number of shares purchased and the average price paid in its quarterly
filings.48
Most issuer share sales are in the form of a “seasoned equity offering,”
whereby the firm sells the company’s shares to investors for cash.49 Such
share offerings can be either “firm-commitment” (where the issuer sells a
specific number of shares at a pre-established price through an
underwriter)50 or “at-the-market” (where shares are sold directly on the
market through an agent).51 Issuers effecting such sales must have an
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018).
See id. § 78p(a).
41 See id.
42 See id. § 78p(a)(2)(C).
43 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 812
(2014) (noting the “overwhelming majority of repurchases take the form of an [openmarket repurchase]”).
44 See id. at 813 (explaining that “a firm traded on NASDAQ or another stock exchange
is required to announce” stock repurchase programs).
45 See id.
46 See Fried, supra note 43, at 813. It is common for issuers to announce that their
repurchase program is contingent upon favorable market conditions, which grants great
flexibility in execution.
47 See id.
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2021).
49 Fried, supra note 43, at 821.
50 Id.
51 Id.
39
40
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effective shelf registration statement (with appropriate prospectus and
supplements) on file with the SEC.52 In addition, as with open-market
repurchases, the issuers typically report any seasoned equity sales in their
subsequent quarterly SEC filing.53 For example, an issuer that engages in
at-the-market share sales typically reports the total number of shares
issued and the proceeds.54
The following analysis assumes the preceding requirements are
satisfied and focuses exclusively on whether an issuer’s (or its insiders’)
purchase or sale of the firm’s shares in response to being targeted by
expressive trading will run afoul of the anti-fraud provisions of Section
10(b).
B. Hypothetical Case Studies
Three scenarios help to bring into focus the question of when issuers
or their insiders can buy or sell shares in their own company’s stock in
response to price fluctuations driven by social-media-driven expressive
trading:
!

Scenario 1: XYZ Corporation’s stock price had been falling due to
a short-sale attack by a small group of hedge funds. In the past
week, a group of individuals in a social media chatroom have
attempted a now well-publicized short squeeze, motivated by a
desire to punish what they view as predatory behavior by the hedge
funds. As a result, the stock price has been driven up, significantly
above where the stock was trading before the short-sale attack.
Based on this information, XYZ and some of its insiders issue/sell
XYZ shares.

!

Scenario 2: XYZ’s stock price has been driven down by a wellpublicized SMD short-sale attack, commenced because XYZ
would not commit to installing solar panels on company property.
In response, XYZ and some of its insiders buy XYZ shares.

!

Scenario 3: XYZ is a once-dominant brick-and-mortar business
struggling against online competition. It is experiencing significant
financial troubles, and management fears that bankruptcy is
imminent. XYZ management has now privately received word
from a social media influencer that a group of SMD traders who

See id., see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2021).
See James D. Small III, et al., The Resurgence of United States At-the-Market Equity Offerings
to Raise Capital in Volatile Equity Markets, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 290, 302 (2009).
54 See id.
52
53
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remember XYZ fondly from their youth wish to save XYZ from
bankruptcy. The influencer informs management that these SMD
traders will engage in an SMD run on XYZ stock with plans to
drive up the stock price. This, they hope, will rescue the company
from impending bankruptcy. XYZ does not disclose this
information to the public. Based on this information, XYZ and
some of its insiders buy XYZ shares.
Each of these scenarios involves two separate sets of facts that could
provide the grounds for insider trading charges to the extent that they
form the basis for trading in XYZ stock. The first set pertains to the SMD
traders’ behavior affecting the stock’s market price in a way that may or
may not be public. The second set is the internal data regarding the stock’s
value to which XYZ and the insiders are privy. Whether this internal data
is public depends on whether it has been recently disseminated in XYZ’s
quarterly or annual filing with the SEC (and absorbed by the investing
public).
The materiality of the first set of facts is relatively straightforward, as
the kind of movement in stock price that SMD trading is capable of
generating is important to investors. The question of materiality
concerning the company’s internal data is more complicated. The
argument could be made that any reasonable shareholder would like to
have access to that data. Even if the data merely confirms the market
trading price, it would reduce uncertainty regarding the price and change
the total mix. Yet this would mean that an issuer and its insiders would
always be in possession of material, nonpublic information, and they
would therefore never be allowed to trade in the corporation’s securities.
As a practical matter, therefore, it makes little sense to think of internal
data as material unless it indicates a significant difference between the
market value and the “true” value. The recognition of this practical reality
no doubt informed the Supreme Court’s elevation of the materiality test
from the “might” “affect the value of the corporation’s stock”55 test to the
current requirement that information is only material if there is a
“substantial likelihood that the disclosure . . . would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.”56
Consider the following example. XYZ has historically traded between
$25 and $35 but has dropped in recent years to around $10 due to faltering
sales. The stock price appears to have stabilized, but financial markets, by
their nature, always involve some variability. If under these circumstances,
55
56

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 441 (1976); see supra Section I.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988); see supra Section I.
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internal data indicates that the “true” price for XYZ stock is actually $9.99
or $10.01, there is little reason to suspect that the internal data is material.
The greater the disparity between the market price and the price indicated
by internal data, the greater the likelihood that the internal data will be
material, rendering any trades by XYZ or its insiders illegal under Rule
10b-5. If the “true” price were $1 off the market price—$9 or $11 instead
of the market price of $10—caution would be appropriate, and that
caution would increase as the differential increased. As described below,
however, the dramatic price effects of SMD expressive trading can change
these assumptions and alter the materiality analysis.
In Scenario 1, then, the stock price has risen significantly as the result
of the SMD trading. Say, for example, that the hedge funds’ short selling
had driven the price down to $5, but the short squeeze then drove the
price up to $300. Continue with the assumption that the internal data is
nonpublic, having not been recently disseminated and absorbed, but the
existence and effect of SMD trading—the short squeeze in opposition to
the hedge funds’ actions—is all over the media.
That the short squeeze is ongoing is certainly material, but the
materiality of the internal data is more complicated. Once XYZ’s stock
price has risen by an order of magnitude above that dictated by, say,
analysts’ public valuations (as was the case in GameStop and AMC), it is a
stretch to say that there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would “consider . . . important” an insider’s knowledge
pertaining to XYZ’s fundamentals.57 In other words, the gap between the
market and “true” value should be so large that the inside information
would be unlikely significantly to alter the “total mix” of information on
which average investors would base trading decisions. The potential effect
of the internal information is almost certainly subsumed within the effect
of the surge caused by SMD trading; with a clearly enormous pop driven
by SMD trading, the potential effect of unrevealed, nonpublic information
is simply not important to a trading decision.
A brief pause is appropriate to appreciate exactly what has been
revealed here. At the outset of the SMD trading, the moment the market
price deviated in a significant way from that justified by the internal data
(say the SMD drives the stock to $7, but the internal data suggests a “true”
price of $5), that internal data became material. In that moment, both
facts—the existence and effect of SMD trading, as well as the internal
data—are material. But as the effect of SMD trading grows (say it pushes
the stock price from $5 to $300), it remains material but its materiality
drowns out any impact of the internal data, rendering the latter effectively
immaterial. When that happens, the effect of the SMD trading becomes
57
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what this Article calls hypermaterial. Nevertheless, one crucial question
remains: how “inflated” does the stock price have to be before the effects
of the SMD trading achieves hypermateriality, thereby rendering the
internal data immaterial—50%? 100%? 300%?
For any given corporation under these circumstances, it is ultimately
unclear at what price XYZ and the insiders in Scenario 1 could sell XYZ
stock without risking insider trading charges. Unless the disparity between
the internal data and market price is either quite small or quite large, a
corporation would face a significant risk that a determined SEC
enforcement official might proceed with an insider trading investigation.
In Scenario 2, the short-selling and the activist reasons driving it—the
price has been driven down for reasons having little to do with XYZ’s
overall financial health—are public, but the internal data is not, as it has
neither been absorbed and disseminated nor capitalized into the
company’s stock price. Similar to Scenario 1, the materiality of the effect
of SMD trading is apparent after returning to the numerical example.
Imagine that the short-sale attack has driven the stock price down to $1
per share. While also a reduction of one order of magnitude, it may not be
as immediately obvious that a reduction from $10 to $1 is significant. That
is, of course, until one remembers that there is an absolute floor of $0, so
significance on the downward side can be measured against the increasing
risk of bankruptcy.
While some potential investors might sympathize with the attack, it is
clear that the price has been depressed for collateral reasons and that the
price of XYZ stock is therefore far “too low.” Once again, the gap
between the market and “true” value is large enough that the inside
information is unlikely to be substantially important to the reasonable
shareholder or to significantly alter the “total mix” of information. The
effect of SMD trading has again become hypermaterial and overwhelms
any potential impact of the internal information. As a result, XYZ’s and
insiders’ nonpublic, internal data concerning the true value of the company
(and the fact that the current SMD price represents a profitable buying
opportunity) has become immaterial
XYZ and the insiders may have an additional motivation—which nonshareholders may not share—for buying shares in Scenario 2. In the face
of an attempt to punish XYZ for failure to comply with the attackers’
demands, XYZ and its insiders may not be trading for profit. Instead, they
may be trading primarily to defend the corporation against an attempt to
coerce the corporation into adopting a strategy that runs counter to
management’s reasoned judgment. Corporate law grants management
substantial leeway to defend against attempts to force changes in corporate
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strategy, even when those demands come from long-term shareholders.58
In this scenario, the demands come from those who have
circumvented the traditional corporate governance mechanisms,
attempting to coerce change entirely from the outside. Standard corporate
law principles should empower managers to defend the corporation from
such coercion.
Scenario 3 is the only one of the three in which the case for insider
trading is straightforward. Returning to the numerical example, consider if
XYZ’s stock price begins to fall again, dropping from its temporary
equilibrium of $10 to $3. At that point, the SMD traders, motivated by a
sense of nostalgia, indicate that they will be engaging in an effort to drive
the price back up. Unlike the short squeeze in Scenario 1, the reduction in
stock price was not the result of a short-sale attack, and any rise in stock
price will be the result of nostalgia, not profits. Importantly, it is not clear,
ex ante, how high the price will rise.
The SMD trading has not yet taken place, and the news of the
imminent SMD trading remains undisclosed. The existence and likely
effect of the SMD trading is therefore nonpublic, as is the internal data to
which XYZ and the insiders are privy. As for materiality, information of
the impending surge would be considered important by the reasonable
investor and would change the total mix of information available in the
market. Moreover, unlike in the previous two scenarios, there is no
hypermaterial public information that would render the otherwise-material
inside information immaterial. Moreover, the trading is also motivated not
by a desire to defend the corporation, as in Scenario 2, but by a desire to
get ahead of the impending stock-price surge, weakening any argument
against insider trading charges based in state corporate law deference to
management defense of the corporation.
Consider for a moment that only a small change to Scenario 2 would
result in the same conclusion. If, in that scenario, all parties to the
extortion attempt stayed quiet, perhaps delivering their ultimatum to the
corporation but not publicizing it, the SEC or Department of Justice
The most basic manifestation of this leeway is the business judgment rule, precluding
shareholders from challenging corporate strategy unless there is a plausible breach of the
duty of loyalty or gross negligence. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
(“[The business judgment rule] is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of
discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.”). Similar leeway is granted
when management is fending off external threats to the corporate strategy, as through
enacting takeover defenses. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985) (“When a board addresses a pending takeover bid . . . its decisions should be
no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business
judgment.”).
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would be more justified in proceeding against XYZ and the insiders. The
insiders might still be motivated by a desire to defend the corporation,
rather than a profit motive. But the short-selling attack would be
nonpublic, rendering the anticipated effects of SMD trading activity both
nonpublic and material. As a result, the internal data would remain
material, and either the internal data or the expected effects of the SMD
trading would provide grounds for insider trading charges.
Indeed, this reality provides an additional layer of strategy for the SMD
traders who could either choose to publicize their short-selling threat
against XYZ—in order to increase its overall effect on the stock price—
or else they could keep it quiet to eliminate one possible defense by XYZ
management. In either case, the SEC has the capacity to identify the shortselling conspiracy and could confirm with XYZ insiders regarding their
attempt to defend against it. And yet, the SEC may still pursue an
investigation and charges. After all, the SEC has, on occasion, pursued
liability for others—like Raymond Dirks in his attempt to expose fraud—
who were motivated at least in part by socially beneficial goals.59
CONCLUSION
The preceding three scenarios illustrate some of the important insidertrading questions that arise in the context of SMD expressive trading.
More, they illustrate some confusion issuers and insiders may face in
applying the materiality test. Internal financial data is not material as long
as the market valuation and the internal valuation are reasonably close,
within the natural range of market uncertainty. Once the differential
increases beyond a certain point, that internal data becomes material.
But—and this is a big “but”—as the differential increases, the internal data
eventually becomes, arguably, immaterial. And, importantly, the reason it
becomes immaterial has nothing to do with the internal data itself, but
rather the current or expected effects of SMD trading, which can become
hypermaterial.
The nature of the current materiality analysis applied by the courts
renders it nearly impossible for anyone to know precisely when internal
data passes from immaterial to material as market price diverges from the
price supported by the internal data. Adding layers of complexity and
uncertainty, SMD trading that has a significant impact on the divergence
can reverse the direction of the relationship. As SMD drives the price
further and further away from that justified by the internal data, the
materiality of that data first rises, then falls, and eventually reaches zero. If
59
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the initial boundary between immateriality and materiality is uncertain, it
is doubly uncertain where the second boundary is—between mere
materiality of SMD trading and hypermateriality.

